Baseline visit v1 schema · facts legacy-derived · descriptive report
Requested addresshttps://www.nytimes.com/
Jul 2, 2026, 2:34 PM UTC
complete; derived from status and warnings
Public corrections ledger · SBL-CORR-2026-002
SBL-CORR-2026-002: The policy entity matcher did not recognize Amazon and Oracle under their catalog names. An unmentioned-entity result for Amazon Ads or Oracle Advertising is not reliable evidence that the policy omitted the company. Original policy text was not retained, so individual mention results cannot be reconstructed. Consult all clarification events for this report.
Review-worthy
The scan observed signals a non-expert should not have to decode from raw request tables.
The cards below translate the evidence into plain language. This failed or incomplete evidence is not ranked against corpus percentiles; positive signals remain visible as lower bounds. The request log, domain table, and methodology remain below for verification.
Worth checking
100 requests matched the default filter lists of Brave Shields, the ad and tracker blocker built into the Brave browser, while loading normally.
Computed with Brave's own ad-block engine and default filter lists in classification mode: matched requests were not blocked by the scanner and remain in this report's observed request counts. Matching shows what Shields would target on this visit's traffic; an actual Shields visit blocks these and also prevents their follow-on requests, so this number is neither a measured block count nor the total effect.
Context
Neither visit recorded a control activation, so neither can be shown to reflect the choice it attempted, and this diff mostly shows run-to-run variance.
Many consent banners are only shown to visitors in regions where the law requires them (the EEA, UK, or California), so this scanner's location may simply not be served one; a banner may also use controls this scanner's catalog does not recognize, or a click may have been dispatched on a candidate that showed no observable reaction within the scanner's confirmation window. No claim about the site's consent behavior can be made from this pair of visits.
Worth checking
1 resolved target matched Brave filter lists; those matches do not identify the operators.
The scanner followed DNS CNAME chains from first-party subdomains and checked resolved targets against the service catalog and Brave filter lists. These matches do not establish a request's purpose, profiling, or an intent to conceal tracking. A filter-list match alone is not a verified service identity or proof of tracking.
Context
Media.net, PubMatic and Criteo, plus 3 others were sent requests during this visit, but the policy text matched none of the names this scan knows those companies by.
Policies often disclose vendor categories rather than company names, so an unnamed vendor is a transparency gap worth reviewing, not automatically a violation. Named in the policy: Google.
Review-worthy
Google, Amazon Ads and Magnite, plus 6 others appeared in the request log.
A catalog match identifies a maintainer-reviewed service/domain mapping; it does not establish why an individual request occurred, what it carried, or whether profiling happened. Functional catalog labels include analytics / tag management, advertising and advertising / supply-side platform. This scan could not identify 14 of the 39 third-party hosts recorded here, so it cannot say who operates them. That is a limit of identity coverage, not evidence about the site. The role taxonomy assigns these additional services explicitly non-tracking operational, support, security, consent-management, or hosting roles: Datadog.
Context
This visit dispatched requests to catalogued domains for Google.
The domain matches identify services, not the requests' purpose, payload, or whether any profile linking occurred.
Nothing observed
Google Analytics was observed, but no DoubleClick remarketing sync appeared in this visit.
Standard analytics collection was observed, without the stats.g.doubleclick.net advertising sync.
Context
4 third-party cookies showed up during the visit.
The scanner observed cookie metadata whose domain crossed the scanned site's registrable-domain boundary. This report does not retain cookie values or partition keys, so it does not establish whether a cookie was a persistent identifier or could recognize a visitor across sites.
Context
Listener coverage that could observe typing-related input events was registered through call chains that included a third-party script.
This is a behavioral instrumentation signal from listener registration, stack-attributed script origins, and known-vendor requests: it shows the page was instrumented to observe interaction, not that anything was transmitted. Stack attribution records the script origins present in the bounded registration call chain; a cross-site origin in that chain does not by itself establish that the cross-site script registered the listener, because first-party code can register its own listeners through a helper served from elsewhere. A different registrable domain is also not by itself a different operator: sites commonly serve their own scripts from a separate asset domain, so the card says third party only when the catalog or reviewed ownership attributes an origin to another organization. On scanners that run the active keystroke-capture probe, actual transmission is tested separately (a synthetic value is typed, never real input, and no typed values are collected); treat this card as a review prompt rather than proof.
Context
A WebGL detection satisfied only the earlier single-signal rule, so it is shown as an observation, not counted as a heuristic match.
Only the earlier single-signal rule matched: before 2026-07-20 the scanner recorded the WebGL heuristic after either a WebGL parameter read or a pixel readback, and the current rule requires both. WebGL calls can be legitimate (charts, graphics, maps), so this is a review prompt for this visit, not proof of fingerprinting.
Raw evidence
The findings above are built from the stored report. Load the request rows, domains, cookies, storage keys, browser signals, visit phases, charts and CSV export when you want to check them; the versioned report JSON is always available below without this interface.
This versioned report is currently retained in the public corpus. Follow the currently retained site history, repeat the same public route when it is available, or request a transparent evidence correction.
Integrity and provenance
20260702-e89ba83ad8f1bb1b4c98aef2ce0a9685Recorded provenance is self-reported measurement metadata, not a cryptographic attestation. The public versioned report JSON contains the retained public evidence; see the methodology for interpretation and retention limits.
This report covers what the scanner measures, not everything a site can do. 17 browser surfaces are not instrumented at all (Every page except the one that was scanned; Anything that only loads after scrolling or interaction; Why a request happened, as a causal chain; and 14 others), 3 capabilities are declined by policy, and 3 are outside what any single visit can see. Their absence from this report is not evidence that they did not occur. Read the published coverage boundary.
Detector accuracy is unmeasured. No calibration study currently publishes a precision or recall for the detectors on this page, so a detector match here is a recorded observation, not a calibrated classification. A study has been recorded for pixel-events and does not support a published rate under the current build. How detector accuracy is measured.
Approved use boundary: This report is investigative evidence that requires independent corroboration. It is not a standalone legal determination and not the sole exhibit in a legal proceeding. Recorded in this project's release manifest on .